As competition in the US electricity industrv grows, utilities (and others) 
A lors que la competition dans l'industrie de I' etectriciU americaine grandit, les services d'utilite publique s' inquieten! davantage des augmentations dll prix de l'electricite qlle causent souoent les programmes de gesiion axee 5 11 1' la demande (GA D). En consequence, plusieurs compagn ies de services d'utilite publique ont reduii I'en -. vergllre de leurs programmes GAD

Introduction
For yea rs, DSM advocates and skeptics ha v e ar gued ove r th e proper economic test to use in as sessi n g utilit y DSM programs (California Pu blic U tili ties Commiss io n and Energ y Commission 1987). The ad vocates favor use of the total resource cost (TRC) test, which minim izes th e tot al cost to customers of electric ity services. They b eli ev e th at utilities shou ld acquire DSM re sources whenever it cost s less to do so than to acquire ne w power sup p lies. The skep tics favor the ra te impact measure, which mi nimizes electricity prices. They b elieve tha t utilities sh ou ld offer only tho se DSM programs for which participatin g customers ar e w illing to pay.
During th e lat e 1980s and ea rly 1990s, the TRC proponen ts seem ed to p revail. U tilities stead ily in creased th eir expen d itures on DSM programs fr om 1989 through 1993, and increased th e energy savin gs of th ese programs ev en more rapidly (Hirst 1994) . During the p ast year or two, h ow ever, th e tide seem s to h av e changed. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 and other forces ar e increasing competition in th e US electricity indust ry. Th at competition is leading u tili ties, thei r re gu la to rs, a n d their customers (especia lly the large industrial s) to examine all factors that mi ght increa se electricity prices . Th e increasing focus on th e p rice of electricity as a key deter mi nant of utilit y competitiveness is affecting th eir DSM programs. Recent examples include:
• Louisiana Power & Lig h t Co mpany (1994) proposed to w ith draw its DSM programs, citing : fundamental changes ... in the Company's expectations abo u t th e future env iro n me n t ... . The electric utilit y indust ry is be coming increa singly competitive. In such an environment, the utility m ust recognize tha t prices are a critica l facto r in reta in ing cus tome rs who are capable of tu rn in g to othe r so urces ... . LP&L now proposes to u se the Rat epayer Imp act Mea sure test as the primary economic criterion for se lect ing its dem an d-side management programs ....
• Potomac Electric Pow er Com pany's (1994) integrated res our ce plan suggests that much of the TRC benefit of DSM programs can b e obtained with n o adverse rate im pact. Focusing more on th e rat e impact m ea sure, rather than on the TRC test, w ill allow th e utility to cu t its DSM cos ts by abou t half w hile retaining 70 to 80% of th e energy and demand b en efits that would have accrued w ith TRC-d esigned p rograms.
• Public Service Company of Colorado's (1993) re source p la n proposed DSM p rograms th at would con tr ibu te more th an 30% of th e increme n tal resources during th e 20-year pl anning period (cu tting demand 10% and energy 7% by the year 2012). Implem enting th ese p rograms would increase elec tricity prices sligh tly eve ry year of that 20-year period (ro ughly 2% ov er the full peri od ). The utility exp licitly limi ted its selecti on of DSM p ro g rams to th ose that would result in no more th an a 3% ra te increase.
• PacifiCorp's (1994) res ource plan exa mi ned the tradeoffs between the ra te impact measure and th e TRC test. Its ana lys is consi dere d th ree leve ls of DSM. Inc reasing from low to medium DSM cu ts total costs by 0.5% an d ra ises average p ri ces by 0.7%. Going fr om m ed ium to hi gh DSM fur ther cu ts cos ts by 0.3% and furth er rai ses rates by 0.6%.
Th ese examp les show that: (1) utilities are in creasingl y concerned abo ut th e effects of 2 DSM programs on electricity prices; and (2) DSM p ro gr ams often raise prices. Th ese exa mpl es are difficult to interp ret because so m any factors d iffer from utilit y to utility. Th ese facto rs include th e inten sity of DSM programs, th e underl ying utility cost str uctu re and ret ail tariffs, avoided costs, and th e regu la tory treatment of DSM-program cos ts.
This s tu dy uses ORFIN to exam ine p arametrically the ra te impacts of DSM (Hi rst and Hadley 1994b) . ORFIN is a spreadsheet model th at sim ula tes an electric u tility's financial operatio ns and performance; it produces annua l income statemen ts, balance sheets, and cashflow s ta temen ts. (See Hirst and H adley (1994a) for add itional details on th e model and its results .) Here, w e use ORFIN to exam ine the two factors th at contribute to DSM' s effects on prices: th e cost of th e p rograms th emselves, and th e loss of revenue associ at ed w ith fixedcos t recovery caused by the program-induced re d uc tio ns in energy use and demand. Th is se con d factor occurs when th e re d uction in reven ues associated w ith low er usage excee ds the reduction in uti lity cos ts.
Reference Utility
We u se hi storical d ata from the Energy Information Administra tion (1993) to creat e a utility th at is "typical " of US in vestor -owned elec tr ic utilities. Th e ca pita l an d operating costs for the na tional average utility in 1992 were apportioned as follows: 67% ge neration, 6% tran smission, 14% d ist ribution, 4% customer service, and 10% administrative an d genera l. Thi s split alloca tes th e annual capi tal costs to th e elemen ts of operations on th e basis of the su p p or ting electric p lant (e.g., power plants and transmission system) .
Ca lcula ting variab le and fixed cos ts is di fficu lt because the results depend strongly on the time period considered. In the sh or t term (say one year), th e primary variable cos ts are fue l and variable operations and maintenance a t p ow er plants, both of w hich vary with electr icity production . Some cos ts, such as transmissio n and distribution (T&D) maintenance and investment, are variable over th e co u rse of a few years; th ese costs vary wi th local or system peak demands or wi th customer growth ra ther than w ith energy production. Fin all y, in th e lon g term, ge nera tion investment is variable and can be thought of as a function of bo th d eman d grow th (peaking un its) and energy grow th (baseload units).
ORFIN incl u des two retail customer cla sses, res iden tia l an d commercial! industrial (C / I). The tariffs for th ese -tw o classes ar e consis ten t w ith those used b y US investor-owned utilities . The residen tia l tari ff includes a month ly cus to mer ch a rge of $10.67 and an energy charge of 8.8rt/ kWh, as of 1993. The com mercial tari ff includes a monthly customer charge of $14.08, an en ergy ch ar ge of 405 rt / kW h, a n d a d emand ch arge of $9 041/kWmon th . All costs are in nominal US dollars.
The effects of DSM programs on electricity prices, bo th sh or t-term and lon g-term , dep end on th e exten t to w h ich utilit y cost s vary with electricity consu m p tion and demand (kWh and kW , respe ctively ). In any giv en ye a r, a sm all ch ange in consumption w ill reduce the · va ria b le co s ts associa ted with generation (fuels, purchased power, and variable operations and maintenance). In a similar fashion , a sm all change in demand may reduce som e T&D op erating cos ts and perhaps d efer cap ita l cos ts for power plants, transmiss ion lines, and di stribution syste ms. De ferra l of th ese capital cos ts is increasingl y likely if changes in dem and p er sist year after year. Th us, in the sho rt term, reductions in demand or sa les produce on ly sm all reductions in utility costs. In the long term, however, th ese reduc tions can crea te much lar ger cost sav in gs.
To cap tu re the changes in annual cos ts th at a utility DSM program could avoid, we structured av oide d generation an d T&D cos ts as fo llo ws. Fo r th e fir st several ye a rs (through 1999), av oided cos ts are very low , reflecting a reg ional m ar ket that h as considerable exce ss cap acity an d low-cost ene rgy. Beginning in the year 2000, avoided costs increase rapidly to their stea dy-sta te va lues in 2002. These hi gher valu es reflect the n eed to construct n ew facilities to m ee t in creasing demands. Th e total a voided cos ts a re ba sed on th e assumption th at the DSM p rogra ms av oid 50% of th e syste m-average d emand-related T&D cost s. This assumptio n is cons is tent with th e experience of a few utilities that are targeting their DSM programs to particu lar areas to d efer T&D inves tmen ts.
Reference DSM Program
We constructed a reference DSM program to use as th e basis for our analysi s. The program operates in 1995 The program operates in , 1996 The program operates in , and 1997 to yield a 1% reduction in p eak demand as of January 1, 1998 . (These ORFIN sim u la tions u se 1993 as th e ref erence yea r, and 1994 as the first year of model operation .) The p r ogram h as a conservation load factor (CLF) of 40%, which means that electricity consump tion is cu t 0.67% in 1998, given a system load factor of 60%. (eLF is th e ratio of the DSM-program-induced average demand re d uc tion to its peak-deman d reduction.)
Th e ini tial cos t of the progra m is $1192/kW (3.6 rt/kWh), of which the utility pays half; participating customers p ay the other h alf. Th e measures are ass umed to last 15 years on average (Massach use tt s Electric 1994) . The utilit y cos ts are added to ra tebase and capita lized over a 10-year b ook life. The DSM -p r ogram costs are recovered fro m eac h customer class in direct proportion to the allocatio n of the program itself. Th e progr am's cos ts and effects are split 33%:67% between the residential and C/I sec tors, cons isten t w ith eac h se ctor's sha re of to ta l sa les.
The initial cost is set to yield a TRC benefitto-cost ra tio of 1.5. This level of cos t effec tiveness is consistent with that found by Eto et al. (1994) in th eir rev iew of C / I lighting programs. It is al so similar to the Massachusetts Electric (1994) assessmen t of its 1993 DSM programs. Eto et al. (1994) found that lighting programs, including all utili ty and customer costs, av era ged 404 rt/kWh (1992 dollars at a 5% real di scount rate) and h ad a benefit/ cost ratio (based on the utili ties' then avoided cos ts) grea ter than 1.0. The Massachusetts Electric (1994) analyses showed b enefit / cost ra tio s of 1.8 fo r C /I programs and 1.2 for residential programs, lead in g to an overall ratio of 1.6.
We wan te d th e effects of DSM to fall entirely on cus tom ers , not on u tility sharehold - impacts. For the reference case, increasing the CLF increases the ad verse price impacts for all years ( Figure 2 ). Doubling the CLF roughly doubles the p rice impact. (We maintained the TRC benefitlcost ratio at 1.5 for th ese cases; that is, we lowered the cost of DSM per kW saved as the CLF was lowered.) The price impact increases with increasing CLF because program costs increase and because the FCR component increases with increasing energy (kWh) savings. DSM-program impacts depend on the customer class(es) at which the programs are aimed. The price impacts differ across customer classes because these classes face distinct tariffs that have different demand and energy charges. In the present case, the residential class pays a monthly customer charge and an energy charge, but no demand charge. The C/I sector pays all three components. Because of these differences, which lead to a much higher energy charge for the residential cla ss than the C/I clas s (8.9 vs 4.6¢ / kWh in 1994), the rate impact of DSM is greater for the residential class than for the C/I class. Differences in class load factor also affect the price impacts of DSM pro grams. Although increasing the fraction of the DSM budget allocated to the re sidential sector increases the rate impact, the effect is much less pronounced than for either program cost or CLF.
DSM programs can be targeted to sp ecific locations with T&D investments that could be deferred, thus increasing the benefits of such programs. We exam ined the price impacts of DSM for programs that offset from 0 to 200% of the system-a verage avoided T&D costs.
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ers. Therefore, our analysis includes annual rate cases based on a future test year. These assumptions ensure that utility shareholders neither gain nor lose because the utility runs DSM programs. In other words, shareholder return on equity is unaffected by the existence or size of th e utility's DSM programs.
Over the 15-year lifetime of the DSM investment, this program cuts total costs by 0.13%, and raises average electricity prices by 0.25%. Th e price increases grow during the initial years, when program costs are being ad ded to rates and avoided costs are low (Figure 1) . The price impact peaks in 1998 at 0.7%. Alt h ou gh the price impact is always positive, it declines monotonically from 1998 th rough 2012 to 0.05%. In this case, program costs account for 55% of the price increase over the analysis period, with fixed -cost recovery (FCR) accounting for the other 45%.
Th e area below the dotted line is the price impact associated with fixed-cost recovery, and the area between the dotted and solid lines is the price impact associated with recover y of program costs.
Several attributes of the DSM programs affect electricity prices. The most important attribute is th e cost of th e p rogram. Program costs per kWh and kW saved can be substantially affected through a careful selection of : (l)technologies that match well the cu stomer's facility; and (2) marketing techniques that id entify and target various market segm en ts. In addition, customer contributions to the costs of th e m ea sures and their installation will affect electricity prices (although customer contributions have no effect on the TRC estimates). The CLF, allocation of program efforts among cu stomer clas ses , and the geographic focu s of the programs (to defer T&D cost s) also affect elec tricity prices.
Th e CLF affects retail prices in two ways. Fir st, the program's benefits depend on the va lues of avoided capacity and energy costs. Second, the retail tariffs (in particular, the existence and lev el s of demand and energy charges) aff ect th e FCR component of price 19 98 Th ese results show that th e adverse effects of DSM on electricity prices for a high-cost u tility (on e w ith a large di fferen ce b etw een average and margi n al cos ts) are not as great as one migh t assume. The contribu tio n of the FCR effect to th e DSM-induced price increase is subs ta ntially hi gher for th e h igh-cost utility, 66 vs 45% for the p eriod 1998-2 012, but the p ro gram-cost effec t is unch anged. Also, th e la rger FCR effec t is m u ted by the higher ini tial (without DSM) price.
Utility Costs and Retail Tariffs
In the b ase case, th e mon th ly customer char ges a re low, $10 to $15/mon th, for b oth the residential and C /I classes. This lo w charge is based on an assignmen t of only 5% of th e utility's fixed costs to the cu stomer charge (with 50% assigned to th e dem and charge an d 45% assigned to the energy charge) . In th e cases exami ned h ere, w e assigned in creasing fractions of th e fixe d costs to th e customer charge. Fixe d cos ts include all th e op erating costs associa ted with T&D an d cus to mer service n ot assigned on a p er-kW basis, plus all the capital cos ts (depreciation, property and income taxes, in terest payments, and re turns to shareholders) .
Th e effec ts of DSM programs on electr icity p ric es d ecrease as th e perce ntage of fixed cos ts assi gned to th e cu s tomer charge in cr ea ses. This change occurs because increasing the custom er charge reduces the demand and energy charges. Lower ing these vol u metric charges tow ards their short-term marginal-cost values reduces the FCR componen t of th e DSM -induced price increase. Sta ted differently, th e effec ts on electricity price of DSM-p r ogra m cos t recovery are indep endent of th e str u cture of retail tariffs. Bu t the recovery of fixed co sts d epends stro ngly on th e str uc ture of th ese tar - The key iss ue with utility cos ts concerns th e amount of a utility' s fixe d cos ts relative to its sales, w hich affects the FCR com pone n t of the DSM price impact. To test th e effec ts of such changes, we inc reased an n u al administrativ e and general expenses fro m $200 to $350 million, in creased ge neral plant in vestment from $0 to $100 million / year , and in crea sed th e utility's initial assets from $5410 to $6500 million . These changes in cr ea sed th e I S-year average electricity price b y almost one-fourth, from 7.1 to 8.7¢/kWh. Co mpared to the reference utility describe d ab ove, thi s utility h as much hi gher fixed costs.
A dding th e same three-year DSM pro gram to th is h igh -cost utility has the following effect s. Because th e cost of the program is th e sam e, its effects on prices from year to year are the same as in th e base case. However, th e FCR co m pone n t more th an doubles to 0.019 from 0.008¢/kWh d urin g th e I S-year period . Thi s is to be expecte d because, in thi s case, the difference be tween re tai l ra tes (higher th an in the ba se case) and avoided costs (unchanged from the base case) a re greater. Overa ll, th e These cos ts include th e demand-r elated component of bo th operating an d capi ta l cos ts, but not the fixed-an d custo mer-cost components.
Increasing th e T&D cos ts avoided by DSM reduces the rate impact. Again, th e effec t is less than for chan ges in program cos ts or CLF. Th e most important ex ternal factor affecting the price im p acts of DSM programs is the utility' s avoided costs . We tested the effects of h a ving a v oide d co sts increase four ye a rs so oner (an d also fou r years lat er) th an in the base case. As expected, w hen av oided costs increa se sooner, the adverse effec ts of DSM on rates are reduced for the fou r years th at av oided costs are affe cte d . In particular, the maxim um p rice inc rease is red u ced from 0.71 to 0.45% in 1998 . During th e 15 years, prices increase an a verage of 0.20% r ather than 0.25%. If avoided cos ts in crease four years lat er, h ow ever, the effects of DSM on electricity p rice s ar e extended ov er more years. In thi s case, the I S-y ea r average price in cr ease is 0.32% ra ther th an the 0.25% in th e base case.
If avoided cos ts ar e l ¢/kWh higher each year than in the ba se case (e.g ., to reflect th e environmen ta l cos ts of fossi l-fuel combustion), the price impacts ar e reduced as follows . In the in iti al years (through 1998, w h en th e p rogram's cos ts are fu lly re flecte d in prices an d avoide d cos ts are low), the effects ar e small. In the foll ow ing years, h owev er, th e h igher av oide d cos ts reduce th e adver se rat e impacts of DSM by almost 0.1% each year. Ov er th e full analysis p eriod, the price increase is reduced fr om 0.25 to 0.18%.
The key regulatory factor of relevance is the m ethod used to recover DSM program cost s (inclusion in rat eb ase or treatment as an operating expense). Exp ensing DSM-program cos ts requires the utility to re cover in rates its cost s in th e year the y are in curred . Ratebasing these cost s, on the other hand, treats them as capital in vestments on w hi ch th e utility ea rns a return as well as d epreciat ion over th e 10 -ye ar book life of th e m ea sures. In addition to p a yments fo r dep re cia tion an d re turn on investmen t, customers p a y for th e in come an d property ta xes associated with these co sts w hen th e utility ra tebases its DSM cos ts. Thus, th e n et present value of costs is hi gher with ratebasing than with expensing, based on use of th e af ter-tax cos t of capita l for di scounting. As expected , th e rat e impacts with expens ing ar e much sharper th an w ith rat ebasing ( Figure  4 ). On the other h and, on ce the program is comple te d in 1997, th e only rate impact with expens ing is that ass ocia ted with th e FCR effect. iffs . With 100% of th e fixe d cost s assigned to the monthly customer charge, th e FCR com p on ent is n egative (i.e. , el ectricity prices a re lower) an d the price impact of DSM is cu t from 0.018 to -0.035¢/kWh, from 0.25 to -0.04% over the IS-year period. The irony of th ese results is th at w ith all fixe d cos ts assigned to th e monthly cu stomer charge, cu stomer s face no adverse price effects of DSM. On th e other h and, because th e volum etric charges are low er, cust omer s fac e little incen tive to in v est in efficien cy m ea sures on their own. And th ose th at participate in th e utilit y's DSM programs ga in less. In th e cases exam ine d h er e, th e residential energy charge declines fro m 8.9¢ /kWh in th e b ase case to 3.8¢/kW h in the cur re n t case. Co rrespondin gl y, th e cus to mer ch arge increa ses from $11 to $91/mon th, a lev el th at m any reg u la to ry com m iss ions an d cus to mers m a y fin d unacceptabl y high. However, these change s may be more consistent with a corn petitive electr icity ma rke t, in w hich p rices re flect more closely the time-varying sh ort-term costs of produc tion. 
Comb ined Effects
\Ve exa m ined, in th e precedi ng sections, th e independen t effects of various fac tor s on electricity prices. Here we sho w th e circumstances in w hich DSM yield s TRC ben efits wi th n o increase in electricity prices. Reducin g p rogram cos ts (e.g ., b y using m arket transformation s tra tegies, working closely w ith trade allies, or sh ifting more cos ts to par ticipating cus tom ers ) and focusing DSM programs on tho se geograp hica l areas w here large T&D investmen ts can be deferred can cut ra te im p acts. The FCR com p on en t of DSM price effects can be reduced by putting m ore of the utility fixed costs in the m onthly cus to mer ch arg e (and th erefore putting less in th e volum et ric ch ar ge s for d em an d and energy). And ad justing th e tim in g of DSM progra ms to matc h avoided cos ts can cu t price im pacts.
We combine these factors to see w hat th e net effect on electricity p rices is. Cu tting DSM program cos ts in h alf (fro m $600 to $300 / kW so th at cu s tomers n ow pa y 75%, rather than 50%, of total cos ts) cu ts th e 15-year price increase by on e-four th . Increasing the percen tage of T&D cos ts th at can be avoided b y DSM programs from 50 to 150% cuts th e 15-yea r price increa se in h al f. Increasing th e perce n tage of fixe d cost s assi gned to the monthl y customer charge from 5 to 20% cu ts th e p rice increase by 15%. And shi fting avo ided cos ts four ye a rs ea rl ier cu ts th e price increase b y 20%. Com bin ing th ese four changes cu ts th e price increase from 0.25 to -0.03% ( Figure 5) .
Th e combin ati on of factors d escribed ab ove leads to a DSM p rogra m tha t low ers electricity prices. Very small price in creases occur w hile th e p r ogram is in effect. Beginnin g in 1999, however, prices every year are low er wi th DSM th an withou t. Prices decline beca use avoided cos ts a re hi gher an d undepreci at ed p ro gr a m cos ts are low er. Pr ice decreases average 0.03% betw een 1999 and 2012.
Wh eth er or not thi s combinati on of factors and its effect on electricity p rices is reasonab le depends on th e specific utility and its DSM p ro grams. We think it is possib le to run ca refu lly desig ned a nd targeted DSM programs th at low er electricity prices. Becau se suc h p rograms re qu ire pa rticipan ts to p ay a su bs ta n tial sh are of th e DSM costs, participation is likely to be low er th an in p r ograms where th e utility p a ys for m ost of th e DSM . Because suc h progra ms focus on those geographic areas with hi gh av oided T&D cost s, th e p otential to reduce th e need for ge neration (an d its a ttendant pollution) is red uced relative to system-wide programs.
U tilities th a t run broadly ba sed DSM progr ams, however, are likely to experien ce modes t price increases. Only if n a tural gas p rices increase or p oll ution -control requirements on power plants become s tricter w ill DSM con sistently offer th e p ossibilit y of b oth cos t an d price d ecr eases. Pye an d N adel (1994) , in their review of ten s tu d ies, found only modest rate impacts caused by utilit y DSM p rograms, w it h a medi an impact of 1.7%. Neverth eless, many utilities and regu la tory com missions ar e concerned about the se effect s and the possibi lity th a t th ey may inc rease w ith time.
Conclusions
We desig ned thi s stu dy to quantify th ose impacts an d to sh ow w hat factors in crease or d ecrease th ose p rice effect s (Tab le 1). W e v aried th e cost, conserva tion load factor, mi x am ong cu stomer classe s, and geograp hica l tar geting (to av oid T&D cos ts) for d ifferen t DSM p ro grams. We modified the utility's cost struc tu re a n d th e frac tion of fixed co st s assig n ed to the monthly cu stomer charge. We va rie d avoided ge nera tion cos ts, the timing of th ese av oided cost s, ta x ra tes , an d the regulatory treatment of DSM program cos ts. Finally, we com bined severa l of these changes to create a situ a tion in w h ich DSM red u ced electricity p rices.
These ORFIN sim ula tions suggest the following:
• DSM p r ograms often increase elec tr ici ty prices sligh tly . Although su ch programs ge nerally reduce electric bills, th ey typically increase price s throu ghout the life times of the measures inst alled.
• Th e situa tion today is different from what it was several ye ars ago. Then, DSM was expec ted to inc rease prices for only a few years, after w hich cu stomer s w ou ld enjoy both low er bill s and lower prices. The ch ange in exp ectation is a conseque nce primarily of ch anges in avoided cos ts . While a voided cos ts seve ral yea rs ag o w ere h igh er than embedded costs, th e reverse is often true today. With avoide d cos ts below average costs (because of low natural gas prices and recen t advan ces in combustion-turbine technologi es), DSM often rai ses electricity prices.
• However, utilities can run DSM programs that redu ce elec tri city p rices. Reducing DSMprogram costs and focu sing programs on tho se areas w here large T&D in v estments can be deferred w ill cu t th e program-cost com p onen t of p ri ce increa ses . Adjus tin g th e timing of DSM programs to m atch av oide d costs an d 8 sh if ting more of th e utility's fixed cos ts to th e month ly cu s tomer charge w ill cut th e fixedcost-reco ve ry component of price increases.
Ultima te ly, th e d eci si ons of utilities an d p ub lic uti lit y commissions on DSM programs w ill hinge on much m ore than th e p rice imp acts of th ese p rograms. As San Diego Gas & Electric (1994) no ted:
C urren tly , SDG&E has a la rge an d successfu l DSM p ro g ram in place, con tin uin g th e direction tha t w as es ta blis he d as a res u lt of the Ca lifornia Collaborative Pro cess in 1990. This p ro gram was implemen ted to ad d ress m ar ket ba rri er s to cost-effective en er gy efficiency me asures. At th at time, it w as determined that utility in volvement in energy efficiency was necessary to overco me these bar riers, so that cos teffe ctive energy efficiency could be a viable resource op tio n in Ca lifornia. SDG&E believes that th e m a rket barriers tha t n ece ssitated utility DSM programs still ex ist and a strong utilit y ro le in DSM is s ti ll re q u ired if tho se progr ams are to continue to thrive.
DSM provides su bs tan tial econ om ic a n d environmental b enefits to utilities, to th eir customers, an d to so cie ty at lar ge . One import ant benefit is lower em iss ions of carbon dioxid e, a major con trib u tor to greenhouse warmin g, w hi ch is now completely unregulated.
Finally, th e DSM-induced p ric e increases d iscussed h ere ar e ver y sm all compared with in te r-utility price differ ences. To illustrate, el ectricity prices to commerc ial cu stomer s range fr om 3.1¢/kWh to 12.9¢/kWh among US utilities. At a m or e aggregate level, retail prices vary b y more than a factor of three among sta tes. Th ese price differences a re ca used primarily by di ffer ences in genera tio n costs, such as exp en siv e capacity, excess capacity, and qualifying-facility contracts. Giv en the results presented h ere an d utility d at a on th eir DSM programs, th e national effect of DSM programs on electricity prices is probab ly quite sm all, on the order of 2%.
To ex am ine empirically th e relationship be tw een prices an d utility DSM progr ams, w e com p u ted th e correla tion b etw een re ta il electrici ty prices and th e p erc entage of revenues spen t on DSM program s for th e 860 utilities 14 1/ The percentage TRC saving s is th e d iffer en ce between th e DSM case and th e no-DSM case in the net p resen t va lue of utility revenue requireme nts plus custome r cos ts associated with participating in the DSM program . Th ese cost s are d iscounted over the 15 years a t 7.8%, the utility's after-ta x cos t of capita l.
that: (1) ran DSM programs in 1992; and (2) sold to re ta il cus to mers. The correla tio n coefficient was only 0.01, sh owing n o re la tions hip between these two variables. The correlation coefficien t for th e comparable se t of 952 utilities with DSM programs in 1993 was also very sm all, only 0.04. Thus, the la rge interutility differences in elec tr icity prices are ca used almost entirely by non-DSM factors.
In summary, DSM p rograms oft en inc rea se electrici ty prices, but th e effects are quite sm all. These effects are small b oth in absolute terms and re lative to th e many other fact ors th at affect electricity prices. Thus, the threat of increa sing competition, by itself, sh ou ld n ot deter utilities and their regulators from acq uirin g cost-effective DSM resources.
